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THE MEDICAL LIABILITY EXEMPTION:  
A PATH TO AFFORDABLE PHARMACEUTICALS? 
CARRIE E. ROSATO1 
ABSTRACT 
 Patent monopolies are tolerated because we believe they promote progress that benefits 
society. What should be done when these monopolies actually increase human suffering? 
Drug prices in America are fifty to eighty percent higher than the rest of the world, meaning 
many cannot afford drugs that will improve or even save their lives. When striking a bal-
ance between the interests of the patent holder and that of the public, it is important to bear 
in mind that the rewards granted to patentees are secondary to the public benefit derived 
from their labors. The ideal solution would come from Congress creating a need-based ex-
ception to drug patent infringement, but this is unlikely to occur. An infrequently used stat-
utory exemption, found in Section 287(c) of the Patent Act, precludes liability when a physi-
cian infringes a medical process patent. With the advances in 3D printing, doctors will soon 
be able to print drugs for their patients. The courts could interpret 287(c) to protect physi-
cians from patent liability for printing drugs when provided to patients demonstrating fi-
nancial hardship. When faced with new technology, the courts have been creative in inter-
preting the intellectual property statutes in order to reach a just and equitable resolution. 
The public need for affordable drugs should spur the courts to such creativity when address-
ing the issue of 3D drug printing.  
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 An unsettlingly high number of people lack access to prescription 
drugs.2 As of 2009, it was estimated that 10 million children die each 
year from preventable or curable diseases, mainly in developing 
countries.3 The high cost of drugs limits accessibility in developed 
                                                                                                  
 1. J.D. Candidate, Florida State University College of Law, 2015; B.A. Biology, Capi-
tal University, 2000. I am grateful for the love and support of my husband and family 
through all of my educational endeavors. I also wish to thank Professor Jake Linford, Flor-
ida State University, for his knowledge and guidance.  
 2. Up to 90 million people in the United States alone. FREDERICK M.  
ABBOTT & GRAHAM DUKES, GLOBAL PHARMACEUTICAL POLICY: ENSURING MEDICINES FOR 
TOMORROW'S WORLD 66 (2009). 
 3. Id. at 116; see also Robert C. Bird, Developing Nations and the Compulsory Li-
cense: Maximizing Access to Essential Medicines While Minimizing Investment Side Effects, 
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countries as well, especially in the United States, where medical bills 
are a leading cause of personal bankruptcy.4 While this problem has 
long been discussed, most proposed solutions have had little impact 
or have not been implemented.5  
 In the United States, one of the largest impediments to low cost 
drugs is the patent system. A drug patent grants the drug company a 
monopoly on that drug for at least twenty years.6 With that monopoly 
a drug company can charge whatever price it chooses.7 Normally, 
competition would push prices to an acceptable level, but the monop-
oly allows drug companies to keep prices inflated, preventing access 
to many. This problem is exacerbated by the Medicare Prescription  
Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act (“MMA”), which man-
dates that Medicare pay the manufacturer’s list price for drugs with-
out any negotiation.8  
 In 1996, Congress amended the Patent Act to allow an exemption 
from damages for infringing medical technique patents, based on the 
infringer’s status as a physician.9 Section 287(c), or the Medical Lia-
bility Exemption, barred patent-holders from seeking money damag-
es or injunctions from medical practitioners or related health care 
entities.10 The policy rationales given for allowing the exemption are 
equally applicable to drugs and medical devices,11 and it remains un-
clear why doctors are precluded from profiting from their process in-
ventions yet drug companies are allowed to use current laws to max-
imize profits at the expense of human health. 
 A solution to this issue should come from Congress, such as a 
compulsory licensing scheme or an amendment to Section 287(c) that 
                                                                                                  
37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 209, 209 (2009) (noting that tens of millions of adults and children 
die each year from treatable or preventable illnesses). 
 4. See Dan Mangan, Medical Bills Are the Biggest Cause of US Bankruptcies: Study, 
CNBC (June 25, 2013, 2:29 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/100840148#. 
 5. See Colleen Chien, Cheap Drugs at What Price to Innovation: Does the Compulsory 
Licensing of Pharmaceuticals Hurt Innovation?, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 853 (2003) (study-
ing the grant of six compulsory licenses over drug patents and concluding there was little 
evidence of a decline in innovation); Cynthia M. Ho, Unveiling Competing Patent Perspec-
tives, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 1047 (2009) (discussing compulsory licenses as a solution to the high 
cost of pharmaceuticals and how different countries have approached the issue).  
 6. 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2012). That monopoly can be extended due to regulatory delays 
encountered while awaiting FDA approval. 35 U.S.C. § 156 (2012); WENDY H.  
SCHACHT & JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21129, PHARMACEUTICAL PATENT 
TERM EXTENSIONS: A BRIEF EXPLANATION (2002).  
 7. See Bird, supra note 3 (stating that strong patent laws create monopolies that 
allow drug companies to raise prices in order to maximize profits at the expense of human 
health). 
 8. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub L. 
No. 108-173, § 303, 117 Stat. 2066, 2242 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-3a(c)(6)(B) (2012)). 
 9. 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (2012). 
 10. Id. 
 11. Throughout the paper I will refer to drugs as a shortcut, but my arguments apply 
to both drugs and medical devices. 
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would limit liability when doctors provide drugs or medical devices to 
patients that meet certain hardship criteria. However, the pharma-
ceutical and health products lobby (collectively known as “Big Phar-
ma”) is the largest lobbying group in Washington. Therefore, Con-
gress is unlikely to change the current system to expand the Medical 
Liability Exception. In the alternative, the rise of 3D printing tech-
nology could allow courts to use the Medical Liability Exemption to 
bar damages from certain “printers” of drugs. When considering how 
intellectual property statutes should apply to new technology, the 
Court has imported concepts from other areas of law to facilitate 
reaching an equitable outcome. This could give the courts some lee-
way to use the fair use doctrine from copyright law to interpret Sec-
tion 287(c) in a way that includes 3D printing as a medical process in 
light of the pressing public health concern. The important public in-
terest in access to affordable pharmaceuticals necessitates that the 
courts step in and make drugs and devices available to those who 
cannot afford them.  
 This Note will propose how the Medical Liability Exemption 
should be amended and failing such amendment, how the courts 
could intervene. Part II gives an overview of the patent system and 
discusses the legislative history of the Medical Liability Exemption 
and how the exemption should be amended. Part III details why such 
an amendment is unlikely to occur and how 3D printing of pharma-
ceuticals and medical devices could be used to prevent the financial 
hardship many patients face. This Part also discusses Supreme Court 
precedent applying old statutory language to new technology. Part IV 
explains the Fair Use Exception found in copyright law and how it 
could be used to interpret the Medical Liability Exemption. Finally, 
Part V concludes that the courts should intervene in the interest of 
human health to minimize liability to physicians that provide pa-
tented drugs or medical devices to patients that would go without 
due to cost. 
II.   THE CURRENT MEDICAL LIABILITY EXEMPTION AND HOW IT 
SHOULD BE AMENDED 
 To better understand the current state of the Medical Liability 
Exemption and how it should be expanded, a brief overview of the 
patent system is necessary. It will be helpful to understand what the 
goals of intellectual property protection are and how those goals are 
furthered by such an expansion. This Part will also consider the his-
tory of the Medical Liability Exemption and how the distinction made 
between medical processes and drugs is not clear. Finally, an 
amendment to the exemption will be proposed to extend liability to 
medical professionals providing drugs to certain low-income patients. 
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A.   Brief History of the Patent System and  
the Medical Liability Exemption 
 The Framers placed great importance on promoting the progress 
of science and the useful arts, granting Congress the power to make 
laws giving authors and inventors exclusive rights to their writings 
or discoveries.12 To acquire a patent, the applicant must meet several 
requirements, demonstrating the innovation is over patentable sub-
ject matter, is properly enabled, and is useful, novel, and non-
obvious.13 Once these requirements are met, a patent can be issued 
for a process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or an 
improvement thereof14 for a twenty-year term.15  
 Patents are usually divided into two categories: product or process 
patents.16 Process patents have been defined as “a mode of treatment 
of certain materials to produce a given result. It is an act, or a series 
of acts, performed upon the subject-matter to be transformed and re-
duced to a different state or thing.”17 Because Congress intended “an-
ything under the sun that is made by man” to be patentable subject 
matter,18 this provision has been construed to grant process patents 
for medical procedures as long as they satisfy the statutory  
requirements.19  
 It is often thought that the purpose of a patent is to confer benefits 
on the patent holder. However, the Supreme Court has stated that 
reward to the owner is a secondary consideration, while the primary 
object is the general benefits derived by the public of the inventor’s 
labors.20 Balancing the various interests of inventors and the public 
is a difficult task that has led Congress to amend the Patent Act  
repeatedly.21  
 One such amendment, the only limitation on patent liability ever 
passed, is the so-called Medical Liability Exemption found at 35 
U.S.C. 287(c). This provision states:  
                                                                                                  
 12. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 13. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103. 
 14. 35 U.S.C. § 101. Section 100(b) defines process as “[a] process, art or method, and 
includes a new use of a known process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or 
material.” §100(b). Of course defining process as a process is quite cyclical.  
 15. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2). 
 16. Weldon E. Havins, Immunizing the Medical Practitioner “Process” Infringer: 
Greasing the Squeaky Wheel, Good Public Policy, or What?, 77 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 51, 
60 (1999). 
 17. Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 788 (1876). 
 18. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (quoting S. REP. NO. 82-1979, 
at 5 (1952); H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923, at 6 (1952)). 
 19. Havins, supra note 16, at 60-61. 
 20. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (citing 
C.J. Hughes in the copyright context in Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932)). 
 21. Id. 
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(c)(1) With respect to a medical practitioner’s performance of a 
medical activity that constitutes an infringement under section 
271(a) or (b), the provisions of sections 281, 283, 284, and 285 shall 
not apply against the medical practitioner or against a related 
health care entity with respect to such medical activity.22 
(2) For the purposes of this subsection: 
(A) the term “medical activity” means the performance of a medi-
cal or surgical procedure on a body, but shall not include (i) the use 
of a patented machine, manufacture, or composition of matter in 
violation of such patent, (ii) the practice of a patented use of a 
composition of matter in violation of such patent, or (iii) the prac-
tice of a process in violation of a biotechnology patent. 
. . .  
(3) This subsection does not apply to the activities of any  
person . . . who is engaged in the commercial development, manu-
facture, sale, importation, or distribution of a machine, manufac-
ture, or composition of matter or the provision of pharmacy or clin-
ical laboratory services (other than clinical laboratory services 
provided in a physician’s office) . . . .23 
 Essentially, 287(c) creates an exception to patent infringement 
liability for medical professionals who use a patented method “while 
performing a medical activity with the goal of treating a human being.”24  
B.   Legislative History of Section 287(c) 
 As would be expected for such a unique exception to the Patent 
Act, Section 287(c) has an interesting legislative history. In 1996, a 
federal district court heard a summary judgment motion in Pallin v. 
Singer.25 The plaintiff was an ophthalmologist who sued several other 
doctors for using his patented cataract surgical technique without a 
license.26 The case seems fairly insignificant, especially considering 
that the court ultimately invalidated all of the contested claims,27 but 
the case generated significant—mostly negative—attention in the 
                                                                                                  
 22. Section 271 details what constitutes patent infringement, while the other provi-
sions describe the remedies available when a patent is infringed, including an injunction, 
damages, and attorney fees. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2012).  
 23. 35 U.S.C. § 287(c). 
 24. See Fariba Sirjani & Dariush Keyhani, 35 U.S.C. § 287(C): Language Slightly 
Beyond Intent, 3 BUFF. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 13, 13-14 (2005). 
 25. Pallin v. Singer, Civ. A. No. 2:93-CV-202, 1996 WL 274407 (D. Vt. Mar. 28, 1996). 
 26. Pallin v. Singer, Civ. No. 5:93-202, 1995 WL 608365, at *1 (D. Vt. May 1, 1995). In 
testimony before Congress, Singer claimed the litigation arose from independent develop-
ment of the identical cataract procedure. See Medical Procedures Innovation and Afforda-
bility Act and Inventor Protection Act of 1995: Hearing on H.R. 1127 & H.R. 2419 Before the 
H. Judiciary Subcomm. on Courts and Intell. Prop. of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th 
Cong. 42-44 (1995) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Dr. Jack A. Singer) (discussing 
patent No. 5,080,111).  
 27. Pallin, 1996 WL 274407. 
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medical community.28 Pallin was the first patent infringement suit 
filed by one doctor against another.29 In a particularly colorful article, 
one “intraocular lens pioneer” depicted Pallin as a “monumental bat-
tle,” which could have “devastating and mind-boggling consequenc-
es.”30 This description is certainly overstated, but the American Med-
ical Association House of Delegates condemned “this relatively new 
phenomenon” of patenting medical and surgical procedures and voted 
to work with Congress to outlaw the practice.31 The American Acad-
emy of Ophthalmology also lobbied to pass legislation exempting 
such procedures from patent protection, and this combined lobbying 
effort would prove successful.32  
 The 104th Congress took up the issue, eventually passing Section 
287(c) as part of the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act.33 The 
first step was a House proposal called H.R. 1127, which would pro-
hibit the issuance of patents on medical and surgical procedures.34 
The bill’s sponsors released a statement citing the policy considera-
tions underlying H.R. 1127, noting medical procedures are the prod-
uct of collaboration and built upon the work of others.35 The Con-
gressmen claimed that medical procedure patents increase 
healthcare costs and “could deny patients access to the highest quali-
ty health care.”36 Some patent experts felt this response was over-
broad.37 Others argued that, by redefining what was patentable sub-
ject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101, this bill directly conflicted with 
the intentions of the Founders who created the patent system.38 H.R. 
                                                                                                  
 28. See William D. Noonan, Patenting Medical and Surgical Procedures, 77 J.  
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 651, 652 (1995) (stating that many physicians consider 
medical technique patents “an unethical interference with patient care”). 
 29. Richard P. Burgoon, Jr., Silk Purses, Sows Ears and Other Nuances Regarding 35 
U.S.C. § 287(c), 4 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 69, 72 (1996); see also Havins, supra note 16, 
at 53 (claiming that physicians rarely enforced procedure patents, but obtained them to 
claim credit). 
 30. Katherine J. Strandburg, Legal But Unacceptable: Palin v. Singer and Physician 
Patenting Norms, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AT THE EDGE: THE CONTESTED CONTOURS OF 
IP 321, 337 (Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Jane C. Ginsburg eds., 2014) (citing Herve M. 
Byron, Is This Déjà Vu?, OCULAR SURGERY NEWS, June 1, 1994, at 13). 
 31. Noonan supra note 28, at 652 (quoting AMA Opposes Patents for Medical, Surgical 
Procedures, AMA NEWS, July 4, 1994, at 6). 
 32. Id. 
 33. Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 616, 110 Stat. 
3009, 3009-67-3009-69 (1996).  
 34. Hearing, supra note 26, at 42-44. 
 35. See Patient Access to Medical Procedures Strengthened in Ganske-Wyden Bill, U.S. 
Congressional News Release, Mar. 3, 1995. 
 36. Id. 
 37. See Noonan, supra note 28, at 664 (suggesting a compulsory license that would 
require the patent holder to license for a reasonable royalty). 
 38. See Burgoon, supra note 29, at 74-75; see also Cynthia M. Ho, Patents, Patients, 
and Public Policy: An Incomplete Intersection at 35 U.S.C. § 287(c), 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
601, 651 (2000) (stating that 287(c) is problematic because it creates an exception to en-
forcement based on a person’s status). 
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1127 would have created a precedent that certain patents are inap-
propriate when they negatively impact a certain profession, thus cre-
ating an exemption based on status. 39  Additionally, “because the 
phrase ‘surgical and medical procedures’ was not defined” in the bill, 
it was unclear how the Patent and Trademark Office would adminis-
ter the law.40 
 These concerns, and opposition from the biotechnology industry,41 
sparked an alternative Senate bill one day prior to the H.R. 1127 
hearings.42 This bill, S. 1334, differed from H.R. 1127 by redefining 
what constitutes patent infringement under 35 U.S. § 271.43 Essen-
tially, it would have the same effect as H.R. 1127 but would allow 
patents to issue on medical techniques while preventing a finding of 
infringement if the infringer was a health care practitioner or associ-
ated entity.44  
 Various parties testified before Congress regarding the merits of 
H.R. 1127, including representatives of the medical community.45 A 
common theme from supporters of the bill was that medical proce-
dure patents would drive up the cost of healthcare, but little data 
was given in support of this contention.46 It was also argued that 
these patented techniques are the result of years of collaboration and 
should be shared with the medical community as a whole, especially 
since such techniques do not usually make significant advances over 
the prior art.47 Representatives Ganske and Wyeth argued such pa-
tents run counter to the Hippocratic Oath by limiting patient access, 
and the United States should join the more than 80 countries that 
have banned patents on medical procedures.48  
 Those opposed to the bill made a variety of strong arguments. Dr. 
Pallin, of ophthalmology patent fame, argued patents are a powerful 
incentive for innovation and this was merely an example of “special 
interest groups seeking privilege.”49 Pallin questioned how H.R. 1127 
would be implemented—would a patented veterinary technique that 
                                                                                                  
 39. See Burgoon, supra note 29, at 75, 77. 
 40. Id. at 75. 
 41. Emtel, Inc. v. Lipidlabs, Inc., 583 F. Supp. 2d 811, 821 (S.D. Tex. 2008). 
 42. Burgoon, supra note 29, at 76. 
 43. S. 1334, 104th Cong. § 2 (1995). 
 44. Id. Scholars have raised the concern that this could constitute a taking under the 
Fifth Amendment. See Leisa Talbert Peschel, Revisiting the Compromise of 35  
U.S.C. § 287(c), 16 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 299, 321 (2008). 
 45. Hearing, supra note 26, at 25-100. 
 46. Id.; Burgoon, supra note 29, at 77 n.27 (noting that the new technique saved patients 
$17 per operation but not considering how licensing fees would increase the patient cost). 
 47. See Hearing, supra note 26, at 24 (statement of Greg Ganske, Rep. of Iowa). 
 48. Id. at 24-26, 65-66 (prepared statement of William D. Noonan, M.D.) (discussing 
the ethical problems with medical procedure patents).  
 49. Id. at 39-40 (statement of Dr. Samuel L. Pallin, M.D., F.A.C.S.) (noting several of 
the Founders who signed the constitution were doctors). 
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later became applicable to humans be rescinded?50 Pallin also doubt-
ed the premise that doctors would choose a less effective method to 
avoid increased cost from licensing a superior patented method, not-
ing that doctors do not buy cheap instruments and similarly will al-
ways choose the best methods.51 His testimony concluded by noting 
that no one questioned patents on costly new drugs.52 This is an im-
portant point, as the distinction between methods and drugs does not 
come from the Constitution or the Patent Office,53 and it seems the 
policy considerations of innovation, cost, and optimal patient care 
should apply equally to both. 
 In his statement to Congress, Dr. William Noonan attempted to 
elucidate a difference between patents for drugs and medical proce-
dures.54 Noonan was in the unique position of being both a physician 
and a patent attorney.55 As such, Noonan felt H.R. 1127 had “the 
kernel of a good idea” but was overbroad and could eliminate patent 
protection for new uses of known drugs.56 Noonan was concerned that 
allowing liability for medical process patent infringement would im-
pact a physician’s ability to choose what treatment was best for a pa-
tient, however he failed to distinguish this circumstance from a pa-
tient’s inability to take the best drug because it was too expensive. 
This view is logical coming from a doctor, whose primary concern was 
doctor liability. However, it remains unclear why an exception should 
be applied to doctors using patented procedures and not patients 
needing expensive patented drugs or devices.  
 Others testified to why medical techniques should be treated dif-
ferently from drugs and devices, with the arguments falling mainly 
in two categories: economics and ethics. The question remains 
whether this distinction is persuasive. One of the predominant justi-
fications for the exemption, which at first blush is convincing, is the 
research and development (“R&D”) cost disparity between techniques  
  
                                                                                                  
 50. Id. at 39. 
 51. Id. at 39-40. 
 52. Id. at 40. 
 53. Id. 
 54. See id. at 61-67 (statement of William D. Noonan, M.D.). 
 55. Id. at 61. 
 56. Id. at 61-62. 
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and drugs.57 However, this disparity is not necessarily accurate and 
the right to a patent does not hinge on the amount spent developing 
an invention.  
 A major rationalization of the patent system as a whole, and par-
ticularly medical patents, is that patents create an economic incen-
tive to create, especially where R&D costs would be prohibitive oth-
erwise.58 Nevertheless, R&D costs are not always as high as manu-
facturers would have the public believe. Drug companies claim R&D 
can reach over a billion dollars, but many drugs do not entail a large 
R&D expenditure.59 In a process referred to as “evergreening,” drug 
patent holders are granted patents for a new delivery system or 
pharmaceutical mixture in order to extend the life of an expiring pa-
tent.60 Despite threats that without charging high prices new drugs 
will not be discovered, half of the new drugs approved between 1998 
and 2007 stemmed from research at universities and biotech firms, 
not big drug companies.61  
 Additionally, it is inaccurate to say that all medical procedures are 
developed with minimal cost.62 An often-used example is the Surro-
gate Embryo Transplant (“SET”) technique for implanting a fertilized 
                                                                                                  
 57. See Hearing, supra note 26, at 48-49 (statement of Jack A. Singer, M.D.) (respond-
ing to a question from Congresswoman Schroeder (D-Colorado), Singer distinguished de-
vice R&D costs from techniques, stating there will always be some expenditure for devel-
opment and marketing for devices, whereas a “pure procedure” comes naturally during 
practice and lacks similar expense). 
 58. Beata Gocyk-Farber, Note, Patenting Medical Procedures: A Search for a Com-
promise Between Ethics and Economics, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1527, 1541-42 (1997). As of 
2009, it was estimated $160 billion was spent globally on medical R&D, however only 3% 
went to diseases disproportionately affecting developing countries. See Ann Weilbaecher, 
Diseases Endemic in Developing Countries: How to Incentivize Innovation, 18 ANNALS 
HEALTH L. 281, 282 (2009). 
 59. Richard Anderson, Pharmaceutical industry gets high on fat profits, BBC NEWS 
(Nov. 6, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/business-28212223. 
 60. See ABBOTT & DUKES, supra note 2, at 3; JAMES BOYLE & JENNIFER JENKINS, 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: LAW & THE INFORMATION SOCIETY CASES & MATERIALS 631 
(2014); Saby Ghoshray, 3(D) View of India’s Patent Law: Social Justice Aspiration Meets 
Property Rights in Novartis v. Union of India & Others, 13 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. 
PROP. L. 719, 722 n.2 (2014). But see Jonathan J. Darrow, Debunking the “Evergreening” 
Patents Myth, HARVARD LAW RECORD, 2010, at 6. 
 61. Robert Kneller, The Importance of New Companies for Drug Discovery: Origins of 
a Decade of New Drugs, 9 NATURE REVIEWS DRUG DISCOVERY 867, 869 (2010). The present 
rate of drug innovation is low and large drug companies often leave R&D to universities 
and smaller biotech firms, therefore the high costs of R&D are not actually felt. See  
ABBOTT & DUKES, supra note 2, at 51. Subsidies are available for public institutions and 
small biotech firms that are not usually available to larger drug companies. See Enrico 
Moretti & Daniel J. Wilson, Innovation and Incentives: Evidence from Biotech, FED. RES. 
BANK OF S.F. (Dec. 8, 2014), http://www.frbsf.org/economic-research/publications/ 
economic-letter/2014/december/biotechnology-biotech-economic-growth/. 
 62. See Ho, supra note 38, at 615-16 (arguing that the distinction in R&D costs be-
tween procedures and devices is unsupported and that drug development costs are well 
documented but similar data on devices is unavailable). 
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egg into a donor’s womb.63 Government funding was denied to the 
SET developers, who needed $500,000 to complete R&D.64 Private 
investors, attracted by the potential profit if the procedure was pa-
tented, stepped in.65 Medical procedures like SET can be just as ex-
pensive to develop as drugs or medical devices. 
 More importantly, it seems the distinction between procedures 
and drugs based on R&D costs is a red herring. Even if it were true 
that medical procedures cost less to develop than drugs, this is a dis-
tinction without meaning. Nothing in the Constitution or the Patent 
Act requires a threshold R&D expenditure to procure a patent.66 
There is a uniform standard for all patent applications—they must 
be new, useful, and nonobvious; and none of the requirements con-
sider the amount of money spent to create the patented subject mat-
ter.67 Thus, higher R&D costs do not justify an exemption for medical 
procedure patents and not patents for drugs or medical devices. De-
spite these criticisms, the substantive provisions of S. 1334 were in-
cluded in the Appropriations Act signed by President Clinton in 1996, 
and the first and only liability exemption to patent infringement 
based on the infringer’s status became law.68 The exemption has been 
rarely used,69 providing evidence that there was no crisis to begin 
with, but it could be utilized in the fight to decrease pharmaceutical 
costs. 
C.   Proposed Changes to the Current Exemption 
 The need for affordable medications is quite apparent in develop-
ing countries, but the problem is also prevalent in the United States. 
Many illnesses require expensive treatment, and cancer treatment is 
illustrative of the financial impact such an illness can have on a pa-
tient and their family. Approximately one in three Americans will 
receive a cancer diagnosis in their lifetime.70 The American Cancer 
Society estimates more than 1.6 million new cancer cases will be di-
                                                                                                  
 63. Gocyk-Farber, supra note 58, at 1542. 
 64. Id.  
 65. Id. 
 66. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 67. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (stating usefulness requirement); § 102 (stating novelty 
requirement); § 103 (stating nonobvious requirement).  
 68. See Burgoon, supra note 29, at 69. 
 69. See infra note 144. 
 70. 60 Minutes: The Cost of Cancer Drugs (CBS television broadcast Oct. 5, 2014), 
available at http://www.cbsnews.com/news/the-cost-of-cancer-drugs/. While cancer inci-
dence rates are declining in men, are stable in women, and cancer death rates have de-
creased slightly, cancer deaths in 2014 still averaged 1600 per day. Cancer Statistics 2014: 
Death Rates Continue to Drop, SCI. DAILY (Jan. 7, 2014), http://www.sciencedaily.com/ 
releases/2014/01/140107102634.htm (citing two published reports from the American Can-
cer Society). 
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agnosed in 2014.71 Americans have access to some of the best medical 
care the world has to offer, but a growing number of patients, even 
those with insurance, cannot afford the drugs their treatment re-
quires.72 The term “financial toxicity” has been coined to describe the 
phenomenon where doctors now need to consider the cost of treat-
ment along with the best treatment methods.73 Patients increasingly 
must cover drug costs themselves—in 2006 one-quarter of patients 
reported depleting most of their savings.74 Unsurprisingly, a cancer 
diagnosis is one of the leading causes of personal bankruptcy.75  
 There are some situations “in which the public benefit from . . . [pa-
tent] infringement may be so great that it outweighs the patentee’s 
interest in its exclusive rights.”76 The creation of new drugs and med-
ical devices, and the immense benefits they provide to society, are 
perhaps an area where the stakes for both sides are highest. What 
could be more beneficial to the public than more affordable medical 
devices and drugs? If ever a situation existed where the public bene-
fit should outweigh the costs of patent protection, this is it.77 Yet 
Congress could not eliminate patent protection of drugs and medical 
devices altogether. While the high cost of R&D does not justify the 
distinction between process and utility patents, eliminating patent 
protection completely would preclude many innovators from continu-
ing to invent in this field. High R&D costs, coupled with no promise 
of a monopoly, would likely scare investors away, halting innovation 
that is incredibly important. How can these competing interests be 
balanced? 
                                                                                                  
 71. AM. CANCER SOC’Y, CANCER FACTS & FIGURES 2014 1 (2014), available at 
http://www.cancer.org/research/cancerfactsstatistics/cancerfactsfigures2014/. 
 72. 60 Minutes: The Cost of Cancer Drugs, supra note 70. 
 73. Id.; see also Matthew Herper, ‘60 Minutes’ Just Attacked High Drug Prices. Here’s 
What You Should Know., FORBES (Oct. 5, 2014, 10:31 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
matthewherper/2014/10/05/60-minutes-just-attacked-high-drug-prices-heres-what-you-
should-know/.  
 74. Bach et al., In Cancer Care, Cost Matters, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 14, 2012),  
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/15/opinion/a-hospital-says-no-to-an-11000-a-month- 
cancer-drug.html?_r=0. 
 75. 60 Minutes: The Cost of Cancer Drugs, supra note 70 (one doctor noting, “[h]igh 
cancer drug prices are harming patients because either you come up with the money, or 
you die”); see also Peter Ubel, Beware of Cancer Metastasizing to Your Wallet, FORBES (Aug. 
16, 2013, 10:08 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/peterubel/2013/08/16/beware-of-cancer- 
metastasizing-to-your-wallet/; Mangan, supra note 4. A 2011 study of 231,799 patients 
found that after four years, 4805 had filed for bankruptcy. S. D. Ramsey et al., Cancer Di-
agnosis as a Risk Factor for Personal Bankruptcy, 29 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY (2011). 
 76. Maureen A. O’Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law, 100 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1177, 1198 (2000). 
 77. Access-to-medicines activist Jamie Love, when discussing the social loss associat-
ed with monopolies and how certain consumers are priced out of the market said, “In eco-
nomics . . . we call this ‘dead weight social loss.’ With essential medicines we call it ‘dead 
people.’ ” BOYLE & JENKINS, supra note 60, at 631-32. 
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 The current language of Section 287(c) makes clear that the ex-
emption is not intended to prevent liability for infringing use of drugs 
or devices.78 However, if the language could be changed to allow such 
infringement in very limited circumstances, the monopoly incentive 
to create would not be too disturbed and those who are most in need 
would be able to receive necessary medical treatment. To accomplish 
this balance, the language of subsections (2)(A) and (3) should be 
changed as follows: 
(2) For the purposes of this subsection: 
(A) the term “medical activity” means the performance of a medi-
cal or surgical procedure on a body, but shall not include (i) the use 
of a patented machine, manufacture, or composition of matter in 
violation of such patent, (ii) the practice of a patented use of a 
composition of matter in violation of such patent, or (iii) the prac-
tice of a process in violation of a biotechnology patent unless all of 
the hardship factors described in subsection (5) are satisfied. 
(3) This subsection does not apply to the activities of any  
person . . . who is engaged in the commercial development, manu-
facture, sale, importation, or distribution of a machine, manufac-
ture, or composition of matter or the provision of pharmacy or clin-
ical laboratory services (other than clinical laboratory services 
provided in a physician’s office) . . . unless all of the hardship fac-
tors described in subsection (5) are satisfied. 
(5) A medical practitioner’s manufacture, use, or distribution of a 
patented composition of matter shall not be infringing when: 
(A) the medical practitioner or related health care entity maintains 
a tax-exempt, nonprofit status as described by the Internal Revenue 
Service in 26 U.S.C. 501 (3)(c); 
(B) the patented composition of matter is distributed at no cost to 
the patient; 
(C) the patient receiving the patented composition of matter can 
demonstrate a financial hardship such that payment for the patent-
ed composition of matter at the manufacturer’s list price would 
make financial bankruptcy likely under 11 U.S.C. 1321-1330; and 
(D) the patented composition of matter is medically necessary to 
improve or sustain the patient’s life.79 
 Subsection (3) already clearly states the exemption does not apply 
to tax exempt organizations that are engaged in commercial devel-
opment, manufacture, sale, or distribution of patented compositions 
                                                                                                  
 78. 35 U.S.C. § 287 (c)(2)(A), (3) (2012). 
 79. Id. This provision is intended to draw a line between drugs or medical devices that 
are treating an illness that impacts a patient’s health versus an elective drug such as Bo-
tox or Viagra. See id. 
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of matter. This language implies there is a distinction between in-
fringing use that is intended to make a profit and infringing use with 
a non-commercial purpose, such as what has been described. A non-
profit medical practitioner or health care entity will be precluded 
from liability when it can demonstrate the patented drug or device 
was distributed at no cost to a patient who needed the drug or device 
to sustain life and if forced to pay the manufacturer’s list price would 
likely be pushed into bankruptcy. This would not impair the drug 
companies’ profits because such patients could not have purchased 
the drug in the first place. Therefore, the delicate balance between 
public benefit and patent incentive would be maintained. 
III.   CONGRESSIONAL INACTION MAY NECESSITATE COURT 
INTERVENTION 
 The conflicting interests of patent protection and the public bene-
fits to society by medical innovation create an ethical dilemma.80 
There is a concern that “alleviating human suffering does not belong 
to the area of economic endeavor or trade and commerce.”81 Several 
solutions have been suggested to amend the Patent Act in order to 
better deal with these special situations where the public interest 
should override the rationales to the patent system. In addition to 
the proposed amendment detailed above, other suggestions include 
compulsory licenses or a fair use exception, both concepts found in 
copyright. 82  While this Note concedes that these suggestions are 
probably more logical and efficient ways to deal with the problem, 
such change would require Congress to amend the Patent Statute. 
The Legislative and Executive branches of the government are 
tasked with policy decisions, and weighing the interests between pa-
tients and patent holders is clearly a policy matter. Unfortunately, 
Congress is unlikely to limit profits derived from patented drugs or 
medical devices. 
 Illness has a huge financial impact on patients and their families. 
This impact should move Congress to act, but a discussion of the lob-
                                                                                                  
 80. Chris J. Katopis, Patients v. Patents?: Policy Implications of Recent Patent Legisla-
tion, 71 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 329, 352 (1997); see also Trade, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy and 
Health, WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/trade/glossary/story073/en/ (last visited 
Apr. 24, 2015) (stating that there is “an inherent conflict of interest between the legitimate 
business goals of manufacturers and the . . . needs of providers and the public”). 
 81. Katopis, supra note 80, at 352 (quoting Wellcome Found., Ltd. v. Comm’r of Pa-
tents, 1983 N.Z.L.R. 385, 388 (1983)); see also Gregory F. Burch, Note, Ethical Considera-
tions in the Patenting of Medical Processes, 65 TEX. L. REV. 1139 (1987) (discussing ethical 
objections raised in the context of patenting medical innovation). 
 82. See O’Rourke, supra note 76; Lorelei Ritchie De Larena, What Copyright Teaches 
Patent Law About “Fair Use” and Why Universities Are Ignoring the Lesson, 84 OR. L. REV. 
779 (2005); Katherine J. Strandburg, Patent Fair Use 2.0, 1 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 265, 266 
(2011). 
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bying effects of Big Pharma will demonstrate why this solution is 
doubtful. The new technology of 3D printing may open a door that 
would allow the courts to effect change in this area. An analysis of 
how the courts have dealt with new technology and the precedents 
that mingle different intellectual property concepts will explain how 
this can be done. 
A.   Illness, a Path to Financial Hardship 
 Despite the obvious need for more affordable drug prices, it is un-
likely Congress will move to limit the profits of drug manufacturers.83 
The need to finance campaigns provides an opportunity for members 
of Congress to be influenced by lobbying groups. The largest of these 
groups is the pharmaceutical lobby. According to the Center for Re-
sponsive Politics, Big Pharma spent over three billion dollars be-
tween 1998 and 2014, the most of any lobbying group. 84  In 2014 
alone, Big Pharma spent more than $230 million, with a total of 1412 
lobbyists serving 350 clients.85 Big Pharma does not just lobby Con-
gress directly; it also donates money to non-profits for campaign 
ads.86 Nonprofits, unlike Super PACs, are not required to reveal their 
donors, and their campaign spending has skyrocketed since the 2010 
Citizens United decision.87 With its money and influence, Big Pharma 
is a huge roadblock to any limitation on the patent protection of drugs.   
 The passage of the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and 
Modernization Act (“MMA”) elucidates Big Pharma’s influence on 
Congress.88 Signed into law in 2003, the MMA introduced an entitle-
ment benefit for prescription drugs to address the increased role of 
drugs in patient care and the high cost born by patients.89 The MMA 
                                                                                                  
 83. See Melissa Ganz, The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, & Moderniza-
tion Act of 2003: Are We Playing the Lottery with Healthcare Reform?, 2004 DUKE L. & 
TECH. REV. 0011 (2004) (noting that due to “an enormous financial interest in maintaining 
high prescription drug prices and market exclusivity, pharmaceutical companies have 
spent millions of dollars to extend patent protection and forestall government regulation of 
prescription drug prices”). 
 84. See Ctr. for Responsive Pol., Top Industries, OPENSECRETS.ORG,  
https://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/top.php?indexType=i&showYear=a (last visited Apr. 24, 
2015). 
 85. Id. A list of top clients includes drug manufactures such as Pfizer, Eli Lilly & Co., 
Novartis, and Sanofi—maker of Zaltrap. Ctr. for Responsive Pol., Pharmaceuticals/Health 
Products,OPENSECRETS.ORG,http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/indusclient.php?id=H04&year= 
2014 (last visited Apr. 24, 2015). In contrast the oil and gas lobby spent $141 million in the same 
time period. Center for Responsive Politics, supra note 84. 
 86. Michael Beckel, Drug Lobby Gave $9.4 Million to Nonprofits That Spent Big on  
2010 Election, THE CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Feb. 27, 2012, 6:42 PM),  
http://www.publicintegrity.org/2012/02/27/8271/drug-lobby-gave-94-million-nonprofits-spent-big-
2010-election.  
 87. Id. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (holding that the government 
may not suppress political speech on the basis of the speaker’s corporate identity).  
 88. See Bach et al., supra note 74. 
 89. See, e.g., Ganz, supra note 83, at 2, 10-11. 
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mandates that Medicare must cover every drug approved by the FDA 
and payments must be at the manufacturer’s list price, not including 
any discounts or rebates.90 Additionally, private insurers are held to 
similar standards by most states,91 meaning the largest “purchasers” 
of prescription drugs have no power to negotiate price.92 If the pur-
pose behind the act was to address rising drug costs, why forgo an 
obvious avenue to price reductions through negotiation?  
 Considering the buying power held by Medicare, such a scheme 
seems illogical and fiscally unsound,93 especially when legislators of-
ten raise concerns over the cost of entitlements.94 At the beginning of 
the millennium, new cancer drugs averaged $4500 per month, but as 
of 2012 prices had risen to around $10,000 per month, with a few 
costing more than $35,000 per month.95 A perfect example is Gleevec, 
considered one of the greatest cancer drugs ever invented, which cost 
$28,000 per year when introduced in 2001, but as of 2014 had quad-
rupled in price to $92,000 per year.96 The effect of the law is obvi-
ous—the monopoly granted by the patent system, coupled with the 
legally mandated prohibition on price negotiation, has led to astro-
nomical drug prices that cannot be paid by many who rely on these 
drugs.97  
                                                                                                  
 90. Medicare Prescription Drug Improvement and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. 
No. 108-173, § 303, 117 Stat. 2066, 2242 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-3a(c)(6)(B) (2012)). 
 91. Bach et al., supra note 59. 
 92. Theoretically, price negotiation was left to the private insurers, but this has 
proved ineffective; it is estimated Medicare Part D could save $116 billion over 10 years if 
Medicare’s low-income beneficiaries were just given the same discount available under 
Medicaid. Editorial, Let Medicare Negotiate Drug Prices: Our View, USATODAY (Apr. 20, 
2014, 5:50 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2014/04/20/medicare-part-d-
prescription-drug-prices-negotiate-editorials-debates/7943745/.  
 93. In 2011, only 17% of drug purchases were not covered by insurance or third party 
payers. Adam J. Fein, Who Paid for Presciption Drugs in 2011?, DRUG CHANNELS (Jan. 8, 
2013), http://www.drugchannels.net/2013/01/who-paid-for-prescription-drugs-in-2011.html. 
This was a major decline from the 1990s, where in 1990 cash customers made 63% of drug 
purchases at retail pharmacies. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., PRESCRIPTION DRUG 
COVERAGE, SPENDING, UTILIZATION, AND PRICES, ch. 3, (2000), available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/ 
health/reports/drugstudy/index.htm.  
 94. In 2013, Medicare accounted for 14% of the federal budget and Medicare payments 
for prescription drugs totaled more than $64 billion. The Facts on Medicare Spending and 
Financing, THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (July 28, 2014), http://kff.org/ 
medicare/fact-sheet/medicare-spending-and-financing-fact-sheet/.  
 95. See 60 Minutes: The Cost of Cancer Drugs, supra note 70. 
 96. Id.; see also Herper, supra note 73. The industry concedes these prices hinder 
medical treatment. Joe Jimenez, chief executive for Novartis the maker of Gleevec, 
acknowledged that price will inhibit the ability to stack therapies and that “[t]he whole 
oncology pricing structure needs to be rethought because it’s reached the level that is not 
going to be sustainable for the long term.” Id. 
 97. It should also be noted that some doctors also have an incentive to keep prices 
high. The “biggest source of income for private practice oncologists is . . . commission . . . from 
cancer drugs” by buying the drugs wholesale and selling them retail to patients. 60 
Minutes: The Cost of Cancer Drugs, supra note 70. 
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 Drug prices in the United States are fifty to eighty percent higher 
than anywhere else in the world, 98  in large part because of the 
MMA.99 The MMA is one of the most expensive bills ever considered 
by the House, contributing to its rather unusual legislative history. 
As Representative Jones recalls, the bill—over 1000 pages—was vot-
ed on at 3 a.m., the morning after the members received it.100 Repre-
sentative John Dingell, Democrat of Michigan, who had been in Con-
gress fifty-two years, said the bill would not have passed without the 
efforts of the more than 1000 pharmaceutical lobbyists. 101  When 
asked the rationale behind prohibiting negotiation of drug prices, 
Representative Burton said the drug companies simply did not want 
it.102 Solidifying the connection between Congress and Big Pharma, 
Representative Billy Tauzin, who pushed the bill through the House, 
became Big Pharma’s chief Washington lobbyist.103  
 The MMA is an enlightening example of Big Pharma’s influence 
over the lawmaking process.104 Coupled with this sway over Con-
gress, there is also evidence that drug companies set prices arbitrari-
ly in an attempt to see what the “market” will bear.105 Zaltrap, a can-
cer drug, is one such example. When first released, Zaltrap cost an 
average of $11,063 per month, over twice the price of a similarly ef-
fective drug.106 The cost was so high that doctors at Memorial Sloan-
                                                                                                  
 98. Id.; see also INT’L FED’N OF HEALTH PLANS, 2013 COMPARATIVE PRICE REPORT: 
VARIATION IN MEDICAL AND HOSPITAL PRICES BY COUNTRY, available at 
http://static.squarespace.com/static/518a3cfee4b0a77d03a62c98/t/534fc9ebe4b05a88e5fbab70/
1397737963288/2013%20iFHP%20FINAL%204%2014%2014.pdf. 
 99. See 60 Minutes: Under the Influence (CBS television broadcast Apr. 1, 2007), 
available at http://www.cbsnews.com/news/under-the-influence/. But see Ashutosh Jogale-
kar, Why Drugs Are Expensive: It’s the Science, Stupid, SCI. AM. (Jan. 6, 2014), 
 http://blogs.scientificamerican.com/the-curious-wavefunction/2014/01/06/why-drugs-are- 
expensive-its-the-science-stupid/ (arguing that greedy pharmaceutical companies are not to 
blame for high drug costs; instead costs are due to the complex and poorly understood bio-
logical systems drugs are intended to work on and the difficult and expensive process of 
taking drugs from initial discovery to market). 
 100. 60 Minutes: Under the Influence, supra note 99 (stating in his twenty-two years of 
politics this was the ugliest night he had ever seen). 
 101. Id. He went on to estimate that of the 1500 bills over the eight years prior to this 
bill’s passing, the drug companies got what they wanted, almost without exception. Id. 
 102. Id. (adding that the drug companies want to make as much money as possible and 
negotiation would inhibit that ability). 
 103. Id. 
 104. An additional example would be the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term 
Restoration Act, known as the “Hatch-Waxman” Act, codified in 21 U.S.C. § 355. Passed in 
1984, the Act permits limited drug patent extensions to compensate for the time it takes to 
get a drug approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). See SCHACHT & THOMAS, 
supra note 6, at 2. 
 105. According to the World Health Organization, the global pharmaceuticals market is 
worth $300 billion per year with the 10 largest companies controlling over one third of the 
market with sales of more than $10 billion per year and a profit margin of about 30%. 
Trade, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy and Health, supra note 80. 
 106. Bach et al., supra note 74; see also Stephen S. Hall, The Cost of Living, N.Y. MAG. 
(Oct. 20, 2013), http://nymag.com/news/features/cancer-drugs-2013-10/. 
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Kettering Cancer Center in New York City decided not to offer the 
drug to patients, stating that doctors must consider financial strain 
on their patients alongside the benefits a drug might deliver.107 Such 
a decision was surprising from a leading cancer hospital because 
medical culture usually equates “new” with “better.”108 It should be 
noted that Sloan-Kettering was able to make such a decision because 
there was an available alternative. Regrettably, with many new 
drugs this is not the case. 
 After the release of the New York Times article detailing Sloan-
Kettering’s decision, Sanofi, the drug’s manufacturer, cut the price in 
half.109 At first, Sanofi claimed the drug was priced competitively but 
eventually conceded that the reduction was due to market re-
sistance.110 As noted by Dr. Peter B. Bach, “Normal markets wouldn’t 
behave like this. You couldn’t introduce something twice as expensive 
and no better and still sell it.”111 Dr. Bach acknowledged Zaltrap’s 
price reduction did little to solve the bigger problem of the minimal 
relation between the prices of drugs and the value they provide.112  
 If surgical techniques and other tools of the “healing arts have 
long been considered a ‘gift from nature to humanity,’ ”113 why should 
the same logic not apply to drugs and medical devices?114 Drug com-
panies often manipulate the patent incentive rationale to leverage 
their monopoly while obscuring the market impact of their predatory 
pricing.115 The patent system creates the perverse reality that phar-
maceutical R&D is driven not by medical need but by profit margins, 
to the financial detriment of patients.116 Normally society is willing to 
bear the cost of limited patent monopolies in order to reap the bene-
fits such innovation provides. Nonetheless, in certain circumstances 
the ability to charge monopoly prices is abused and negatively im-
                                                                                                  
 107. Bach et al., supra note 74. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Andrew Pollack, Sanofi Halves Price of Cancer Drug Zaltrap After Sloan-Kettering 
Rejection, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 8, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/09/business/ 
sanofi-halves-price-of-drug-after-sloan-kettering-balks-at-paying-it.html. 
 110. Id. The article notes that Sanofi offered discounts instead of lowering the price, so 
that insurance and Medicare reimbursements would remain the same and insurance co-
pays would be based on the higher price. Id.  
 111. Id.  
 112. Id.  
 113. Katopis, supra note 80, at 353. 
 114. See Ho, supra note 38, at 631-32 (noting that if restricted access were the driving 
force behind 287(c), there is an equally compelling argument to apply the exception to pa-
tented drugs). An expansion of 287(c) is also an unlikely solution. 
 115. See Ghoshray, supra note 60, at 721-22; see also Greg Martin et al., Editorial, 
Balancing Intellectual Monopoly Privileges and the Need for Essential Medicines, 
GLOBALIZATION & HEALTH (June 12, 2007), http://www.globalizationandhealth.com/ 
content/3/1/4. 
 116. Greg Martin et al., supra note 115; ABBOTT & DUKES, supra note 2, at 32 (“Phar-
maceutical companies are using patents to their advantage, and to the disadvantage of 
public health generally.”). 
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pacts human health. The situation is most dire in the context of ris-
ing pharmaceutical prices. 
 It is implausible that Congress will allow any cutbacks on the 
benefits to drug patent holders because any legislative efforts would 
be blocked by Big Pharma. The only other alternative would be a 
move by the courts to restrict patent infringement liability in certain 
circumstances. When faced with applying old law to new technology, 
the Supreme Court has a history of borrowing from other intellectual 
property disciplines to aid in reaching a just result. The advent of 3D 
printing technology may allow the courts to create an equitable solu-
tion to the drug price disparity based on the fair use doctrine found 
in Copyright law. 
B.   Brief Overview of 3D Printing 
 To better understand how courts could use the Medical Liability 
Exemption to provide drugs to patients who cannot afford them, a 
general understanding of 3D printing is necessary. 3D printing, also 
known as additive manufacturing, is the process of “printing” three-
dimensional, solid objects using a digital file.117 Thin, successive lay-
ers of material are laid down to create the object.118 Essentially, each 
layer is a horizontal cross-section of the item being created,119 much 
like a CAT scan of a brain.120 A virtual design of the object is created 
in a Computer Aided Design (CAD) file for use as a blueprint by the 
3D modeling program.121 A printer uses the CAD file to create the 
object seamlessly, layer by layer, resulting in a three dimensional 
object.122  
 The first 3D printer was created in 1984, and in the early days 3D 
printing was very expensive and not feasible for the general mar-
ket.123 Initially, plastic was the most common material used, but as 
costs have gone down and technology improves, 3D printers can use 
metal, glass, graphite, and other materials.124 Would it be possible to 
break down the materials used into their molecular components, es-
sentially turning 3D printing into a universal chemistry set? Accord-
                                                                                                  
 117. What Is 3D Printing?, 3DPRINTING.COM, http://3dprinting.com/what-is-3d-printing 
(last visited Apr. 24, 2015). 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. See Mayo Clinic Staff, Definition, MAYO CLINIC, http://www.mayoclinic.org/ 
tests-procedures/ct-scan/basics/definition/prc-20014610 (last visited Apr. 24, 2015). 
 121. What Is 3D Printing?, supra note 117. 
 122. Id. 
 123. The History of 3D Printing, REDORBIT, http://www.redorbit.com/education/ 
reference_library/general-2/history-of/1112953506/the-history-of-3d-printing/ (last visited 
Apr. 24, 2015). 
 124. See What Materials Are Used in 3D Printing? It’s More Than Fantastic Plastic, 
LINE/SHAPE/SPACE, http://lineshapespace.com/what-materials-are-used-in-3d-printing/ (last 
visited Apr. 24, 2015). 
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ing to chemist Lee Cronin, who is working on a 3D printer that is 
able to print molecules, the answer is yes.125 Theoretically, 3D print-
ing could then be used to “print” drugs in small batches, at the point 
of need.  
 During a Ted Talk filmed in 2012, Cronin discussed the idea as a 
future possibility, but that possibility is now becoming a reality. Re-
searchers at Louisiana Tech announced a breakthrough in August 
2014.126  A method has been created, “using affordable, consumer-
grade 3D printers and materials,” to make medical implants contain-
ing antibacterial and chemotherapeutic compounds used in targeted 
drug delivery.127 3D printing of drugs has become even more viable 
with the addition of nanoparticles and other additives to common 
printing materials that are already biocompatible.128 This technology 
could be used to print drugs on any consumer printer, anywhere in 
the world.129 With new technology generally comes litigation to de-
termine how existing laws should apply to concepts not considered 
when the applicable laws were created. This is especially true in the 
context of intellectual property. In such circumstances, the Supreme 
Court has been flexible in interpreting the intellectual property stat-
utes, importing or creating concepts that allow the Court to reach an 
equitable outcome.  
C.   Supreme Court Precedent Dealing with New Technology 
 Many critics have argued that 287(c) was passed in error and 
should be repealed.130 Instead, because of the need to get lifesaving 
drugs in the hands of those that cannot afford them, the courts could 
use the Medical Liability Exemption to allow doctors or non-profits to 
3D print these drugs under limited circumstances.131 Courts are loath 
to legislate from the bench, fearing the moniker of an activist judge, 
but in certain circumstances, where Congress refuses to address an 
important public health concern, the court should step in. Scholars 
and practitioners have pointed out ambiguity in the Medical Liability 
                                                                                                  
 125. Lee Cronin: Print Your Own Medicine, TED (June 2012), https://www.ted.com/ 
talks/lee_cronin_print_your_own_medicine.  
 126. Dave Guerin, Louisiana Tech Researchers Use 3D Printers to Create Custom Medi-
cal Implants, LA. TECH U. (Aug. 20, 2014), http://news.latech.edu/2014/08/20/louisiana-
tech-researchers-use-3d-printers-to-create-custom-medical-implants/. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. However, it is likely that materials necessary to print pharmaceuticals will be 
regulated, and access will likely be limited to only pharmacists and medical professionals.  
 130. See Ho, supra note 38, at 609. 
 131. This solution may seem unlikely, but as discussed above, researchers at Louisiana 
Tech University have already developed a 3D printer capable of printing drugs. See 
Guerin, supra note 126.  
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Exemption,132 which would allow courts room to interpret the lan-
guage in light of new technology such as 3D printing. When applying 
old statutory language to new technologies, the courts have imported 
concepts, such as the staple article of commerce doctrine, from other 
areas of intellectual property law in order to reach a just result.  
 One of the goals of Section 287(c) was to harmonize U.S. law with 
international law. 133  International treaties such as the TRIPS 
Agreement refuse to issue patents for medical treatment procedures 
or methods,134 as do most countries addressing the issue.135 A similar 
bill was proposed but fiercely resisted by lobby groups like Big Phar-
ma.136 If the purpose behind 287(c) was to limit enforceability of med-
ical process patents in accordance with foreign laws, then the statute 
should have been patterned after the straightforward language used 
in those laws.137 This would have given courts tasked with construing 
Section 287(c) the benefit of ready interpretations used by similar 
foreign law.138 Instead, the language created in response to pressure 
from lobby groups requires the courts to “guess at the meaning with-
out the aid of any authoritative or persuasive precedent.”139 
 The statute’s language could allow immunity from infringement of 
any process patent, because unlike the TRIPS agreement and other 
foreign law, the statute does not limit the subject matter of the in-
fringed patent. 140  Immunity hinges on whether the infringer is a 
                                                                                                  
 132. See Sirjani & Keyhani, supra note 24, at 16. See generally Joseph A.  
Grundfest & A.C. Pritchard, Statutes with Multiple Personality Disorders: The Value of 
Ambiguity in Statutory Design and Interpretation, 54 STAN. L. REV. 627 (2002) (noting that 
statutory language may be intentionally ambiguous as a means of compromise and explor-
ing the dynamics of exploiting the ambiguity). 
 133. Notice of Hearings and Request for Comments on Issues Relating to Patents Pro-
tection for Therapeutic and Diagnostic Methods, 61 Fed. Reg. 10320, 10323 (Mar. 13, 1996) 
(noting many countries refuse patent protection to therapeutic and diagnostic methods); see 
also Hearing, supra note 26, at 56 (prepared statement of Charles D. Kelman, M.D., Presi-
dent, Am. Soc’y of Cataract and Refractive Surgery) (“H.R. 1127 follows the lead of over 80 
other countries that have banned medical procedure patents.”). 
 134. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, or TRIPS, 
was signed in 1994. The text of the agreement can be found on the World Trade Organiza-
tion’s website. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, WORLD 
TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/t_agm0_e.htm (last visited Apr. 
24, 2015). Today, there are a total of 161 contracting parties. Other IP Treaties, WIPO, 
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/other_treaties/parties.jsp?treaty_id=231&group_id=22 (last 
visited Apr. 24, 2015).  
 135. In fact, scholars have noted that the U.S. decision to grant medical method pa-
tents but refuse to enforce them might violate the TRIPS Agreement—an international 
agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights—which the United 
States has signed on to, because it requires certain minimum protections of patents. See 
Ho, supra note 38, at 653-73; Peschel, supra note 44, at 321. 
 136. H.R. 1127, 104th Cong. (1995). 
 137. Sirjani & Keyhani, supra note 24, at 15-16.  
 138. Id. at 16. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. at 30.  
2015]  MEDICAL LIABILITY EXEMPTION 1087 
 
 
“medical practitioner” and whether the activity that constituted in-
fringement is a protected “medical activity.”141 Section 287(c) does 
expressly exclude the use of a patented drug, device, or biotechnology 
system from immunity,142 but it does not contemplate the possibility 
of a doctor creating or printing such patented drugs and devices in 
the process of treating their patients. The statute and its associated 
conference report are written broadly, and if a court takes a textual-
ist approach, the statute is susceptible to a broad interpretation.143As 
of this writing, only three cases have referenced Section 287(c), giv-
ing little guidance to future courts of how to apply the exemption.144 
If a court were to analyze the Medical Liability Exemption, as ap-
plied to the 3D printing of drugs, there is precedent that suggests the 
court could use the copyright doctrine of fair use to prevent a finding 
of infringement under certain circumstances. The following cases il-
lustrate how the Supreme Court has incorporated concepts from oth-
er areas of intellectual property law when faced with unclear statuto-
ry language and a potentially inequitable outcome. 
 In Sony Corporation of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., the 
Court started their analysis by acknowledging that sound policy and 
history support a “consistent deference to Congress when major tech-
nological innovations alter the market.”145 This is because “Congress 
has the constitutional authority and the institutional ability to ac-
commodate fully the varied permutations of competing interests that 
are inevitably implicated by such new technology.”146 Where Congress 
has not plainly marked the course, such as where new technology is 
involved, courts must be guided by these principles when construing 
the scope of rights created by legislation that did not consider the 
“calculus of interests” currently before the court.147 The Court also 
noted that creative work should be rewarded and encouraged, but the 
ultimate aim is the benefit conferred on the public by the labors of 
authors and inventors.148 “When technological change has rendered 
                                                                                                  
 141. Id. at 30-32 (noting that it is unclear whether the exception would cover dental or 
veterinary procedures). 
 142. 35 U.S.C. 287(c)(2)(A) (2012). 
 143. Sirjani & Keyhani, supra note 24, at 34-35.  
 144. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 138 (2006) 
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (dissenting the majority’s dismissal of the writ of certiorari, Justice 
Breyer argued the Court should decide the case involving §287(c) to aid Congress in deter-
mining whether legislation was needed to help medical practitioners better understand 
their legal obligation); see Lamson v. United States, 117 Fed. Cl. 755, 762 (2014) (finding 
the defense available to the United States as a party); Emtel, Inc. v. Lipidlabs, Inc., 583 F. 
Supp. 2d 811, 824-25 (S.D. Tex. 2008) (interpreting “related health care entity” to include a 
diagnostic video conferencing network link provider).  
 145. 464 U.S. 417, 431 (1984). 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. at 429 (citing Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932)). 
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its literal terms ambiguous, the Copyright Act,” and by analogy the 
Patent Act, “must be construed in light of this basic purpose.” 149 
 In Sony, the new technology to be addressed were VCRs, which 
allowed the taping of copyrighted television broadcast for later view-
ing.150 The copyright holders petitioned the court to find Sony liable 
of contributory copyright infringement or inducement.151 Both con-
cepts are included in the Patent Act, but were fairly novel in copy-
right law.152 Although ultimately finding for Sony, the Court was will-
ing to consider these patent concepts, noting that “[t]he absence of 
such express language in the copyright statute does not preclude the 
imposition of liability” where parties have not engaged in direct copy-
right infringement.153 This form of vicarious liability, a concept found 
in “virtually all areas of the law,” reaches the problem of identifying 
under what circumstance it is just to hold an individual accountable 
for another’s actions.154 It was acceptable to consider incorporating 
these patent concepts of infringement into copyright because of the 
“historic kinship” between the two areas of law.155 Where the infring-
er was in a position to control others’ use of copyrighted works, and 
authorized such use without the copyright holder’s permission, the 
finding of contributory infringement was “manifestly just.”156  
 Sony is most notable for applying the staple article of commerce 
exception in a copyright context. The Court had discovered that as 
technology advanced contributory and vicarious liability had become 
too broad, sweeping up parties that equitably should not have been 
considered infringers.157 Therefore, the Court was also willing to in-
corporate an exemption to contributory infringement found in the 
Patent Act, where precedent did not support infringement liability.158 
This exception, the staple article of commerce doctrine, holds that 
distribution of a component of a patented device is not infringement 
when it is suitable for other, noninfringing uses.159 The concept pre-
vents a patentee from extending a monopoly past the limits of its 
grant, especially where there is a strong public interest in accessing 
such an article of commerce.160 The VCRs in question were analogized 
                                                                                                  
 149. Id. at 432 (quoting Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975)). 
 150. Id. at 417. 
 151. Id. at 434-35. 
 152. See id. 
 153. Id. at 435. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. at 439. 
 156. Id. at 437. 
 157. Matthew Helton, Secondary Liability for Copyright Infringement: BitTorrent as a 
Vehicle for Establishing a New Copyright Definition for Staple Articles of Commerce, 40 
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 1, 8 (2006). 
 158. Id. at 9. 
 159. Id. at 10-11. 
 160. Id. 
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to other staple articles of commerce such as typewriters, recorders, 
and photocopy machines in order to find the VCRs noninfringing.161 
However, as noted in the dissent, the doctrine was intended to pro-
tect those who manufacture components incorporated into patented 
inventions.162 The majority adapted the doctrine to apply to the ma-
chine itself, not just its component parts, in order to reach the de-
sired equitable outcome. 
 Acknowledging there are “substantial differences between the pa-
tent and copyright laws,” the Court found a need to look beyond the 
statutory language to the purpose of the statute—adequate protec-
tion of the monopoly.163 A balance must be struck between the inter-
ests of the monopoly holder and the public interest. 164  This goal 
should apply to protecting the public interest as well as the patent or 
copyright holders. The Court noted that reward to the owner or in-
ventor is a consideration second to the objective of benefitting the 
public from the labors of these inventors.165 The monopoly privileges 
authorized by Congress are not designed to provide a “special private 
benefit” but are a means to achieve the important public purpose of 
progress in science and the arts.166 Sony illustrates that when tasked 
with fitting new technology into old statutory language, the Court is 
willing to import doctrines used in other areas of law in order to 
reach the “manifestly just” outcome.  
 The Supreme Court continued to borrow from patent law in a sub-
sequent case, finding the defendants guilty of inducement.167 Grok-
ster was attempting to capture previous Napster users, after Napster 
was deemed to infringe music copyright holders, by facilitating digi-
tal music downloads.168 The company had created a system intended 
to evade the statutory requirements of contributory infringement so 
that Grokster did not have “actual knowledge” of specific instances of 
infringement and failed to act on that knowledge.169 Attempting to 
apply Sony, the Ninth Circuit read the case strictly and granted 
summary judgment in favor of the defendants, Grokster and 
StreamCast.170 In rejecting this finding, the Supreme Court held that 
                                                                                                  
 161. Sony, 464 U.S. at 426. 
 162. Id. at 491 n.41 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).  
 163. Id. at 442. 
 164. Id.  
 165. Id. at 429. 
 166. Id.  
 167. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 916 (2005). 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. at 927. 
 170. Id. at 927-28. 
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 if a device is promoted to infringe, by clear expression or other af-
firmative steps, then the distributor is liable for infringement under 
a theory of inducement.171 
 The outcome of the case could be predicted by the way the Court 
framed the issue presented as “[t]he tension between the competing 
values of supporting creativity through copyright protection and 
promoting technological innovation by limiting infringement liabil-
ity.”172 Because of the vast number of infringing downloads and evi-
dence of an intent to evade liability, the argument for imposing indi-
rect liability was powerful.173 Even though the Copyright Act does not 
hold anyone liable for another’s infringement, the Court found that 
secondary liability doctrines were well established in common law.174 
While limiting liability to “instances of more acute fault . . . leaves 
breathing room for innovation and a vigorous commerce,”175 finding 
liability premised on “purposeful, culpable expression and conduct” 
did not compromise legitimate commerce or discourage innovation.176  
 Faced with new digital music download technology, the Court 
unanimously decided to incorporate the patent inducement doctrine 
into copyright law.177 Just like in Sony, emphasis was placed on tak-
ing active steps to increase profits by inducing infringement.178 Un-
like Sony, where there was no evidence of intent to increase profits, 
Grokster intended to profit from the use of unlicensed copyrighted 
materials; therefore, a finding of infringement was necessary. 179 
Mindful not to impede commerce or discourage development of new 
technology, the Court found liability under a theory of inducement 
did not compromise these goals.180  
 The back and forth between copyright and patent law can be seen 
in many contexts. The Supreme Court, relying on dicta from Grok-
ster, incorporated the actual knowledge requirement from copyright 
to find a party had induced infringement of a patent.181 Similarly, the 
four-factor test used to determine when a permanent injunction 
should be granted was adopted in a patent case because it was con-
sistent with the approach used under the Copyright Act.182 As a final 
example, the Federal Circuit imported an objective recklessness 
                                                                                                  
 171. Id. at 914. 
 172. Id.  
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. at 915, 933. 
 176. Id. at 915. 
 177. See id.  
 178. Id. at 930. 
 179. Id. at 941.  
 180. Id. at 937. 
 181. See Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2067-68 (2011). 
 182. See Ebay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391-92 (2006). 
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standard to prove willful patent infringement, as required in copy-
right law.183 There is ample precedent to allow a court to incorporate 
concepts from copyright law, such as fair use, when interpreting the 
Medical Liability Exemption of the Patent Act in order to reach an 
equitable outcome.  
IV.   A FAIR USE INTERPRETATION OF 287(C) 
 The public demand for access to affordable drugs can be alleviated 
with the advances in 3D printing technology. The Medical Liability 
Exemption could be used as a shield to protect a medical practitioner 
who provides printed drugs to patients that otherwise could not af-
ford them. This Note makes the novel claim that the Supreme 
Court’s incorporation of concepts from different areas of intellectual 
property law, such as the staple article of commerce doctrine in Sony, 
should inform courts on how to deal with the fair use exemption and 
drug patent infringement. When applying the Medical Liability Ex-
emption to physicians, courts should consider interpreting the ex-
emption in light of the fair use doctrine found in copyright law. If the 
practitioner could demonstrate the drug was medically necessary and 
given at no cost to a patient meeting certain financial criteria, then 
the Medical Liability Exemption should provide a complete defense 
against infringement.  
 It should be noted that there are major differences between the 
Copyright Act and the Patent Act. The Copyright Act grants the cop-
yright holder “exclusive” rights in certain qualified ways184 but also 
provides for the “fair use” of protected works under certain circum-
stances.185 While copyright and patent law concepts are often inter-
twined, patent protection is basically all or nothing—either you are 
liable for infringement or you are not.186 Patents are treated more 
like real property than any other type of intellectual property, allow-
ing none of the exceptions found in other areas of intellectual proper-
ty, such as the fair use doctrine. However, it has been argued that 
this was not the intention of the founders, such as Thomas Jeffer-
son.187 Mark Lemley criticized this trend, stating that allowing intel-
lectual property owners to capture the “full social surplus” of their 
inventions goes against “our economic intuitions in every other seg-
ment of the economy.”188 Even owners of real property may not “in-
                                                                                                  
 183. See In re Seagate Tech., L.L.C., 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 184. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012) (describing the exclusive rights belonging to the copy-
right holder). 
 185. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 432-33 (1984). 
 186. See Ritchie de Larena, supra note 82, at 779. 
 187. See Ruth E. Freeburg, No Safe Harbor and No Experimental Use: Is It Time for 
Compulsory Licensing of Biotech Tools?, 53 BUFF. L. REV. 351, 391 (2005).  
 188. Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 
1031, 1046 (2005). 
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ternalize the full positive externalities associated with their proper-
ty.”189 A fair use exception could be adopted in a broad patent context; 
however, this Note argues only for the doctrine to be used when 
courts consider the Medical Liability Exemption and its applicability 
to printing drugs in certain contexts. 
 When 3D printing becomes common and patent holders commence 
litigation, the Court will again be forced to apply old law to new 
technology. This Note does not propose a solution for all such print-
ing, but in circumstances relating to the printing of drugs for the un-
derprivileged, a court should use the Medical Liability Exemption to 
negate any patent infringement. Congress is too beholden to Big 
Pharma to act on what is an ever-increasing problem, so courts must 
be creative and limit patent holders’ rights when public policy de-
mands. As discussed above, the rationales for passing the Medical 
Liability Exemption hold true not just for medical procedures but al-
so for drugs and medical devices. The important concern that doctors 
will not have access to the best treatment options is just as applicable 
to drugs and devices. This issue has arisen in medical treatment fa-
cilities such as Sloan-Kettering, a hospital that takes seriously the 
financial impact of expensive drugs on patients.190  
 The main difference between procedures and drugs seems to be 
who feels the impact. Doctors fearing infringement liability have 
powerful groups to rely on to lobby Congress, such as the American 
Medical Association. Patients, on the other hand, do not have nearly 
as powerful a lobby. Additionally, when dealing with a serious ill-
ness, a patient or their family is not focused on asking Congress to 
reform high drug pricing. Once that illness has decimated their fi-
nances, that patient or family cannot afford to lobby Congress. Final-
ly, patients who are lucky enough to have the financial ability to pay, 
or who have insurance that covers most of the cost, do not have an 
incentive to lobby Congress.  
 Unfortunately, even if patients were able to lobby, it is doubtful 
Congress would expand Section 287(c) to cover drugs, nor is a differ-
ent statutory solution likely. Big Pharma is the largest and most 
powerful lobbying group, spending more than $230 million in 2014.191 
As they have failed to do so thus far, the members of Congress cannot 
be relied on to put the public health interest in affordable drugs 
above their own financial interests.  
 3D printing will offer many benefits. Drugs can be printed on a 
small scale and tailored to a particular physician’s practice or pa-
tient’s illness. Non-profit groups can be more mobile, taking a small 
                                                                                                  
 189. Id. 
 190. See Bach et al., supra note 74. 
 191. Center for Responsive Politics, supra note 85.  
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set-up to the most effected low-income communities, providing the 
drugs needed at that particular time and place. Doctors that treat 
illnesses associated with expensive drugs, such as cancer, will be able 
to help patients that otherwise would have to forgo a more effective 
line of treatment due to lack of insurance or financial resources. 
However, if these doctors and non-profits are forced to license each of 
the needed drugs, the licensing fees will be an insurmountable barri-
er to providing the needed treatment.  
 With the advent of 3D printing technology, the courts will have 
the ability to effect real change in the area of high drug prices. The 
absence of the staple article of commerce exception in copyright law 
did not prevent the Supreme Court from applying the exception in 
Sony, and it should not prevent importing fair use into patent law in 
this limited context. Balancing the interests of promoting innovation 
in new drugs and saving lives, the Court could construe the Medical 
Liability Exemption in light of its basic purpose—to protect doctors 
and allow them to choose the treatment that is best for their pa-
tients. The process of printing a drug is not outside the definition of a 
process patent.192 In light of this growing public health concern, drug 
printing could thus be considered a medical process exempted from 
liability under Section 287(c). The copyright doctrine of fair use could 
be the vehicle that would allow courts to reach this justifiable outcome. 
 In copyright, if the fair use exception applies, then the user has 
not infringed the copyright.193 The exception was originally a judge-
made doctrine that was codified in Section 107 of the 1976 Copyright 
Act, using language mostly derived from an 1841 opinion by Justice 
Joseph Story.194 The legislative history details efforts to remove fair 
use from the Act, based on the concern that codifying it would alter 
or “freeze” the common law form of the doctrine and judicial discre-
tion along with it.195 One reason for the heated negotiations was the 
controversy surrounding the emerging technology of photocopy-
ing.196 The process of codifying the fair use exception demonstrates 
  
                                                                                                  
 192. See Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 787-88 (1876). Process patents have been 
defined as “a mode of treatment of certain materials to produce a given result. It is an act, 
or a series of acts, performed upon the subject-matter to be transformed and reduced to a 
different state or thing.” Id. at 788. 
 193. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
 194. See Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978-
2005, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 559-60 (2008). 
 195. Id. at 558-59. 
 196. Id. at 559-60. 
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 that even when Congress is aware of emerging technologies at the 
time of drafting, determining a solution is a difficult process that 
does not always end with a perfect solution.  
 As the law currently stands, there are four factors to consider 
when determining whether the fair use exception precludes a finding 
of infringement:  
1. The purpose and character of the use, including whether 
the use is commercial in nature.  
2. The nature of the copyrighted work.  
3. The amount and substantiality of the portion of the use in 
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole.  
4. The effect of the use on the potential market for or value 
of the copyrighted work.197  
 Courts have used different approaches regarding the weight to be 
given each factor, but in a recent decision the Eleventh Circuit stated 
that the factors should not be given equal weight.198 This mirrors the 
opinions of other circuits, which have emphasized that the factors 
should not be applied formulaically and the test is not “an algorithm 
that enables decisions to be ground out mechanically.” 199  Instead, 
based on the circumstances of the case, certain factors will weigh 
more heavily.200 
 When considering the applicability of fair use to 3D printing of 
pharmaceuticals, courts should place more emphasis on the first and 
fourth factors. When considering the first factor, courts generally de-
termine whether the use is transformative or noncommercial.201 This 
analysis generally ties in with the fourth factor’s market considera-
tion, since a noncommercial use is less likely to adversely affect the 
market for the work at issue.202 If a doctor can show a drug was pro-
vided at no cost, in limited quantities, to patients that cannot afford 
the market price, then the use is non-commercial and would not 
                                                                                                  
 197. Id. at 557-58. 
 198. See Cambridge Univ. Press v. Patton, 769 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2014).  
 199. Chicago Bd. of Educ. v. Substance, Inc., 354 F.3d 624, 629 (7th Cir. 2003) (Posner, 
J.); see also Fin. Info., Inc. v. Moody’s Investors Serv., Inc., 751 F.2d 501, 508 (2d Cir. 
1984) (“The four factors . . . are equitable considerations to be assessed and weighed by the 
court; they are not simply hurdles over which an accused infringer may leap to safety from 
liability. Rather than a sequence of four rigid tests, the fair use analysis consists of a ‘sen-
sitive balancing of interests.’ ” (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 
U.S. 417, 455 n.40 (1984))); Beebe, supra note194, at 561. 
 200. Cambridge Univ. Press, 769 F.3d at 1260 (citing Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. 
Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 588 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting)); Wright v. Warner 
Books, Inc., 953 F.2d 731, 740 (2d Cir. 1991); see also Beebe, supra note 194, at 582 (noting 
that different courts give more weight to different factors, but it is generally assumed that 
the ultimate determination of fair use hinges on the fourth factor). 
 201. Beebe, supra note 194, at 583. 
 202. Id. 
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harm the market for that drug. 203  As previously discussed, there 
should be minimal impact on a manufacturer’s profits because the 
patient would not have been financially capable of purchasing the 
drug. To prohibit 3D printing of drugs, the drug manufactures should 
have to prove that even when the printing is done for non-commercial 
purposes there is a likelihood of meaningful future harm to the po-
tential market for the drug.  
 The non-commercial nature of a work is “not conclusive” and only 
one factor to consider.204 While often regarded by courts and commen-
tators as peripheral to the outcome of a fair use analysis, factors two 
and three must also be considered.205 Factor two, the nature of the 
work, draws on the “value of the materials used.”206 Whether a work 
is sufficiently close to the core value to be protected is often deter-
mined by distinctions between fictional and factual works or whether 
the work is published or unpublished,207 but this distinction does not 
apply in the patent context. However, under this factor courts could 
consider what type of drug was at issue and whether it was medically 
necessary. Elective drugs such as Botox or Viagra should not be cov-
ered by the exemption.  
 Factor three, the amount and substantiality of the use in relation 
to the work as a whole, is often disregarded like factor two. It is clear 
that when applied to patent infringement this factor will favor plain-
tiffs because the infringer would have used the entire patent. While 
factors two and three cannot be entirely ignored, determining that 
they favor the plaintiff is not fatal to a defendant’s ability to use a 
fair use defense. The strength of factors one and four coupled with 
the great public health need should tip the scale in favor of finding 
that the Medical Liability Exemption applies to 3D printing of drugs 
in light of the fair use doctrine. 
 Cases like Sony and Grokster illustrate the Court’s willingness to 
find solutions outside of the applicable statute in order to reach a re-
sult that is “manifestly just.” New technologies have been consistent-
ly difficult to deal with in intellectual property cases. Congress often 
does not act quickly enough, and the courts are left to apply existing 
                                                                                                  
 203. However, the commercial or nonprofit purpose is only one element in the enquiry 
into the purpose and character of the infringement. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 
510 U.S. 569, 584 (1994). 
 204. Id. at 585. 
 205. Beebe, supra note 194, at 583. 
 206. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586 (calling “for recognition that some works are closer to 
the core of intended copyright protection than others, with the consequence that fair use is 
more difficult to establish when the former works are copied”). 
 207. Beebe, supra note 194, at 611-15. See, e.g., Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. 
Co., 499 U.S. 340, 348-51 (1990) (contrasting creative works with bare factual compila-
tions); Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 237-38 (1990) (contrasting a fictional short story 
with factual works); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 455 
n.40 (1984) (contrasting motion pictures with news broadcasts). 
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law, despite potentially inequitable outcomes. In the past the Su-
preme Court has balanced the interests of the innovators and the 
public to reach a determination of what seems “fair.” Where the cur-
rent law did not prescribe what was “fair,” the Court borrowed con-
cepts such as inducement from the Patent Act and applied them to 
copyright cases. The same could be done in patent law by importing 
concepts like the fair use doctrine. 
 The Sony court stated that the Constitution assigned to Congress 
the task of defining the scope of protection granted to inventors “in 
order to give the public appropriate access to their work product.”208 
This task involves balancing the interests of inventors in controlling 
and exploiting their discoveries with society’s competing interests, 
and the various intellectual property acts have been amended to ac-
commodate this balancing. 209  Congress did just such a balancing 
when creating the Medical Liability Exemption. Congress had not 
clearly marked the course in dealing with the new VCR technology, 
so the Court was guided by “[t]he limited scope of the copyright hold-
er’s statutory monopoly.”210 Likewise, Congress could not have antici-
pated that a great public need could be cured by allowing patent in-
fringement so long as it is tailored to a limited use, like 3D printing 
would allow. This gives the Court some leeway to construe Section 
287(c) to cover 3D printing as a medical process, in light of public 
health concerns. 
 Allowing such printing will have a huge impact on improving 
health in low-income communities and treating illnesses that have 
high treatment costs. It might even incentivize drug companies to 
lower drugs costs in an attempt to recapture some of those lost cus-
tomers. It could also spur Congress into action, creating a statutory 
exception in certain circumstances.211 The public need for affordable 
drugs outweighs the need to incentivize drug companies; therefore 
the courts should be willing to consider certain printing of drugs ex-
empt from infringement under Section 287(c). 
V.   CONCLUSION 
 The skyrocketing cost of drugs in the United States should be at 
the top of Congress’s priority list. Drugs cost more in America than 
anywhere else in the world, and medical bills are one of the main 
reasons individuals file for bankruptcy. The amendment to the Medi-
                                                                                                  
 208. Sony, 464 U.S. at 429. 
 209. Id.  
 210. Id. at 431 (emphasis added) (citing Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 
U.S. 151, 156 (1975)). 
 211. Although, realistically, intervention from the courts could also spur Congress to 
forbid the printing altogether. 
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cal Liability Exemption proposed in this Note would shield medical 
practitioners from liability when meeting certain criteria. Unfortu-
nately, Big Pharma is the largest lobbyer of Congress and the largest 
campaign contributor for state and local elections. There is little hope 
that Congress will amend the Patent Act to limit infringement liabil-
ity of drug patents. The plight falls to the courts to work with current 
laws to find a solution.  
 With the advent of 3D printing, small scale printing of drugs is 
not just plausible but very likely. The Medical Liability Exception 
could be used to insulate doctors and non-profit organizations from 
patent infringement liability when they provide drugs based on need. 
The courts have taken innovative approaches to analyzing intellectu-
al property statutes when applied to new technology. The great pub-
lic health concern over skyrocketing pharmaceutical costs should 
spur courts to apply the Medical Liability Exemption to 3D drug 
printing when doctors can demonstrate the patient’s financial hard-
ship. The fair use doctrine found in the Copyright Act could be incor-
porated into the patent analysis to determine when physicians 
should be immune from liability. The rarely used Medical Liability 
Exemption could be expanded to have a real impact on suffering pa-
tients who cannot afford the drugs that could improve or even save 
their lives. 
 
